Lê Đức Thọ Và Henry Kissinger

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PARTICIPANTS Xuan Thuy, Chief of North Vietnamese Delegation Vo Van Sung, North Vietnamese Delegate General in Paris Phan Hien of North Vietnamese Delegation North Vietnamese Interpreter One other North Vietnamese Official Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Major General Vernon Walters, Defense Attaché W. Richard Smyser, NSC Staff Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Kissinger: It is a great pleasure to see the Minister again.

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Xuan Thuy: For me too.

Kissinger: How is Mr. Le Duc Tho?

Xuan Thuy: He is now in Hanoi. He has not come lớn Paris again since your last meeting. I told hlặng that Mr. Special Adviser wanted to meet with us. Since he is engaged, he asked me when I meet with you khổng lồ give sầu you his greetings. He said he hoped he would see Mr. Special Adviser again.

Kissinger: Please give him my warm regards. I want to lớn remind you and him of my invitation khổng lồ you khổng lồ visit me in the U.S. when all this is over.

Xuan Thuy: No doubt, when the war is ended, mutual visits will be easier. I hope Mr. Special Adviser will come lớn our country. I don’t know if you have visited Saigon. I hope you will also come lớn Hanoi.

Kissinger: I have been in Saigon. I hope to visit Hanoi. As I have sầu often told the Minister, I have sầu the greademo respect for the courage & dignity of the Vietnamese people, and for the intelligence of Messrs. Le Duc Tho & Xuan Thuy. I only object lớn their tenađô thị.

Xuan Thuy: You are tenacious. Not we. We want an early over to the war. You prolong the withdrawal of troops. We want a prompt withdrawal of troops. You don’t.

Kissinger: Before the end of our discussions, the Minister must let me win at least one argument before my self-confidence is destroyed.

Xuan Thuy: I think you win all the time.

Kissinger: That fact is hidden from me.

A technical point. These meetings are known only to the President & Ambassador Bruce on our side. No one else on the American side. The fact of my visits here is known only khổng lồ the President of France, not to lớn the Foreign Ministry or anyone else.

We are sometimes asked by some of your allies, when you insize them of these meetings. I want you to know we never respond or make known the substance of our conversations.

Xuan Thuy: I understvà that we shall maintain the modalities as before.

Kissinger: Exactly.

Xuan Thuy: Sometimes people on your side ask ours questions. Only a few days ago the press and our acquaintances have asked us that they have heard rumors of secret talks between us on the question of POW’s. I answered them that our position on POW’s is quite clear. No discussion is necessary.

Therefore I underst& Mr. Special Adviser’s position is that your side will not divulge anything in connection with these meetings. We will vì the same.

Kissinger: We won’t even divulge the fact of the meeting. We vì not tell the French what goes on. We have to lớn tell the French that I am here in order khổng lồ get the plane in. But we bởi not tell them the contents. We tell them nothing.

Xuan Thuy: I think that if the Presidency knows, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does too.

Kissinger: I doubt it.

Xuan Thuy: I am prepared now to lớn listen.

Kissinger: I have sầu a rather brief bibleknights.comment.

Last time we met the Minister closed the meeting by saying, “Each time we meet, the meeting is ended with a smile.” However, it is also true that in our previous talks we have made no real progress toward bringing peace lớn Vietphái nam.

I am here in order to lớn bring concrete progress as well as smiles, because if there are to lớn be real negotiations to over the war, these negotiations must be now.

We know each other’s basic views very well. There is no reason khổng lồ waste time on general philosophy, on exhortations, on rhetoric or on an analysis of how we see the situation within Vietphái mạnh or Indochina.

President Nixon has conducted a personal Reviews of the negotiations. He has carefully looked at your positions & we have sầu looked at our own. The President has sent me here to lớn make one last effort khổng lồ break the deadloông chồng.

Here is our final proposal for a settlement. There will be no other in this Administration.

First, we are prepared to mix a terminal date for the withdrawal of all our forces from South Vietphái nam. We would, as I have sầu indicated earlier, arrange for roughly the same timetable for the withdrawal of other Allied forces.

Second, the Vietnamese & the other peoples of Indochina should discuss ahy vọng themselves the manner in which all other outside forces would withdraw from the countries of Indochina.

Third, there should be a ceasefire in place throughout Indochina, khổng lồ become effective sầu at the time when U.S. withdrawals based on the final agreed timetable begin.

Fourth, as part of the ceasefire, there should be no further infiltration of outside forces into lớn the countries of Indochimãng cầu.

Fifth, there should be international supervision of the ceasefire and its provisions.

Sixth, both sides should renew their pledge to respect the 1954 và 1962 Geneva Accords, khổng lồ respect the neutrality, territorial integrity, and independence of Laos and Cambodia. This could be formalized at an international conference.

Seventh, I want lớn reiterate our proposal for the immediate release of all prisoners of war and innocent civilians held by both sides throughout Indochimãng cầu. We believe this issue should be settled immediately on a humanitarian basis. If this is not done, the men must be released as an integral part of the settlement we are proposing in our final offer. We would expect:

—Your side would present a complete menu of all prisoners held throughout Indochina on the day an agreement is reached.

—The release of the prisoners would begin on the same day as our withdrawals under the agreed timetable.

—The release of prisoners would be completed at least two months before the completion of our final withdrawals.

We are prepared lớn talk concretely and lớn make rapid progress. We have sầu framed this offer khổng lồ respond to your proposals. We expect that you will giảm giá with our final proposals in a constructive sầu spirit.

My presence at these meetings has two implications. I would not be here unless the President were prepared to move sầu rapidly toward a negotiated solution.

Second, there is no sense in these sessions if they are used only for us to tell you what we will bởi vì while you will not tell us what you will vì. Negotiations must be a two-way street.

Let me emphaform size to lớn you that our meeting today is crucial. If you look back over our six previous meetings, you can make many criticisms but you cannot accuse me of having ever misled you.

Since 1968 we have done everything that your side & other countries have told us would lead khổng lồ genuine negotiations.

Today we have taken a final step toward you. Now, if ever, is the time for us to reach an honorable settlement.

It is for you to decide, of course, whether further battle will bring you additional gains và if such gains would be worth the additional suffering và losses that will surely come. You must judge whether prolonged fighting against those who pose no long-term threat to lớn you might face you with more real dangers later on & jeopardize your long-term future.

We have clearly made our choice. If necessary we are determined to lớn persist. But we strongly prefer a negotiated settlement.

Therefore we propose lớn start today lớn kết thúc the war and move toward peace. Let both sides refrain from military pressures as we go forward rapidly with negotiations. We propose khổng lồ you one last time khổng lồ work rapidly for a peace that will redeem the sacrifices that both sides have sầu made & that will launch the process of reconciliation.

Thank you Mr. Minister.

Xuan Thuy: (To his interpreter.) May I have these seven points repeated?

Mr. Special Adviser, may I ask you a few questions for clarification?

Kissinger: The Minister would not disappoint me by failing lớn vị that.

Xuan Thuy: The first point is that in your seven point proposal you only mention your disposition to lớn mix a time limit for the withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces. You have not yet set a definite date for these withdrawals.

Do you mean by that that this date should be discussed or that such date will be mix at some time later?

The second point I would like lớn raise is that, in our previous sessions, you and we both said that military questions and political questions should be discussed at the same time. Now in your proposal, I have sầu noticed, you have sầu only spoken of military questions, and leave aside the political questions.

May I pose these two questions? If further questions arise, I will pose them later.

Kissinger: With respect to lớn your first question. We will phối a date when we know that the basic proposition is acceptable to you. Then, when the date is phối, we will discuss the details of all the other points.

With respect lớn the second question, we believe that the proposal we have made reflects the reality of the current situation.

When U.S. forces are finally withdrawn, the political future of South Vietphái mạnh will have to lớn be left khổng lồ the Vietnamese.

Xuan Thuy: I would lượt thích lớn put a question regarding your second point. I feel that you have sầu now reversed the order of these discussions.

Kissinger: Reversed what order?

Xuan Thuy: At the first stage, you said that the U.S. and the Vietnamese would discuss only military questions. As to lớn political questions, they would be settled by the Vietnamese themselves. Then, at the second stage, we have come khổng lồ the agreement that military questions và political questions should be discussed at the same time.

But now, at what you say is the final stage, you have separated these questions again và returned khổng lồ the first stage of our discussions.

That will not settle the problem, because whatever you say the Saigon Administration is one created, set up by the U.S.

Kissinger: Is that a question or a bibleknights.comment?

Xuan Thuy: I am not now stating any views on your proposal. These questions are put khổng lồ see whether I have sầu well understood your proposal.

Kissinger: We have heard from your side for a year that setting a date would lead to lớn constructive negotiations to end the war. We have sầu told you that we cannot bởi both. Since we have sầu told you that, once we set a date, what happens after that is not our responsibility.

Therefore we are now accepting your proposal that we set a date. What happens later will have sầu khổng lồ depkết thúc on the political evolution in Vietphái nam.

Xuan Thuy: I underst& now.

It does not mean that you have accepted our proposal. It is that you want to return lớn your previous position.

Kissinger: It means that we are accepting your proposal to lớn set a date, which you have told us would lead to lớn a settlement of the conflict. It is what I told you when we met in September.

Xuan Thuy: Let me put further questions.

Please, Mr. Special Adviser, what vì chưng you mean by saying that the question of POW’s should be an integral part of an overall settlement, & on the other hvà that the release should be completed two months before troop withdrawals are completed?

Kissinger: I mean that as part of the final offer that I have made, there must be agreement that prisoners will be released. The release of prisoners must be made side by side with withdrawals. The last POW must be released two months before the last American is withdrawn.

Xuan Thuy: I would lượt thích to lớn ask the meaning of the last POW’s being released two months before the last American is withdrawn. The POW’s are a consequence of the war. You are a philosopher. How does philosophy explain that?

Kissinger: Let me make two points:

First, of course, we would release any prisoners which we & our allies hold on the same schedule.

Second, at that point, the number of our forces remaining in Vietphái mạnh will be so small that the direction will be self-evident.

Third, if the Minister và I can solve sầu all the other issues, I believe sầu we will not let philosophy bloông xã a final settlement.

Xuan Thuy: The philosophy is yours lớn explain. There must be a reason for everything.

When you give sầu lessons to lớn students in the university, you should give logic, reasons for doing this.

Why the troops making aggression want to lớn be withdrawn very slowly và very late, & the aggressors captured released first?

Kissinger: They’ll be released at the same time except for a small group. But I don’t think we should waste time on this. It is not an important point.

Xuan Thuy: May I propose now a little break, so that I can Review. If I feel something is unclear, I would pose further questions.

Kissinger: The Minister is difficult enough when he has no time lớn think. I’m not sure I’m serving my own interest.

Xuan Thuy: You have proposed many times that we have a break. Now I vị so.

Kissinger: I need it.

(There was a break of about 45 minutes. For 35 minutes Thuy conferred with his colleagues while his interpreter asked for a copy of the English version of the seven points. They were read khổng lồ hyên and he made a verbatlặng record. During the 10 minute tea & snaông chồng break, Mr. Kissinger bibleknights.comd that the U.S. was not a long-term enemy of North Vietnam.)

Xuan Thuy: First of all, I would like khổng lồ thank Mr. Special Adviser for having presented the seven-point proposal given to lớn you by President Nixon.

You said that this proposal is the final one under the present Administration. There will be no other.

On this point I have sầu no phản hồi to lớn make, because this is up to the Nixon Administration. We have our own point of view.

Now, regarding these seven points, we have sầu just had time to look very perfunctorily at them. Therefore my comments now are based on this perfunctory nhận xét of the seven points. What I will say is only preliminary remarks. It does not mean that we have sầu accepted the proposal, or that we bởi vì not accept it.

Particularly, there is a point we deem necessary lớn elaborate our point of view on, so that there may be no misunderstanding on your part.

You have sầu long known that we tư vấn the PRG 10 & 8 point proposals. I do not repeat our position. But, through the realities of the situation, since we met the last time in September, we have come khổng lồ summarizing in three points confirming to the real situation in Vietnam giới. Since we have sầu not met for a long time . . .

I raised these three points at the 109th session at Kleber Street and later. I repeatedly raised these three points again.

The first point is whether the U.S. accepts the time limit of June 30, 1971 for withdrawal of U.S. and Allied forces. If not, it should propose another reasonable date for this withdrawal for the consideration of the parties. Naturally, such a deadline should be aimed at rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces; it is not for prolonged withdrawal.

The second point is that the U.S. should accept the reasonable và logical proposal of the PRG concerning the formation of an administration in Saigon without Thieu-Ky-Khiem, standing for peace, neutrality, independence, và democracy, và such administration will engage in serious negotiations with the PRG.

The third point is that the U.S. should respect its engagements on complete and unconditional cessation of bombing and acts of war against the DRV, as well as on encroachment on the security of the DRV.

After the 109th session, I kept repeating these three points & I gave sầu more precision, saying that the first point regarding a date for withdrawal is imperative, & should be settled immediately before we go further.

So far the U.S. has not mentioned any definite date for troop withdrawals.

If now the U.S. sets a date, then this will pave sầu the way for a settlement of all other questions rapidly và easily, including the question of the captured military personnel.

I reHotline these three points khổng lồ show that the first point is not separate from the other points, to lớn show that military questions should not be separated from political questions.

However, in the seven points you have sầu just presented, I have two remarks to lớn make:

The first point worth noting is that in your presentation you said the U.S. was disposed lớn mix a date for troop withdrawal, but you did not say a definite date, what day, what month, what year. Such a definite date would pave the way for a settlement of all other questions.

So your representation is not quite conforming khổng lồ what we have been stating.

Kissinger: That, of course, is not my total ambition in life.

Xuan Thuy: Because you said you accepted our proposal, I said you have sầu not.

My second remark is that in our previous private meetings you and I agreed that both military questions and political questions should be discussed at the same time. And now you separate these two kinds of questions.

As I understand, it is always your view that the question of the South Vietnamese Administration should be settled by the South Vietnamese themselves. Theoretically, it is so. But practically, it is known khổng lồ everyone that the U.S. has phối up & backed up the present Administration so far. You kept saying to lớn us that this Administration was formed through elections, và that it has its own political structure.

This affirmation is for diplomatic & propagandomain authority fields, but when we come khổng lồ a settlement, we should go lớn the root, to the nature, of the problem. Therefore, if now you return to your original position, saying that you will maintain the present Administration in South Vietnam giới, & you refuse to discuss the political problems at the same time, then one of the basic problems will not be settled.

Now I would like to speak about the public opinion in South Vietphái nam. They are talking a great giảm giá khuyến mãi about the coming elections.

You have sầu been telling us for some time that you vày not want a change in South Vietnam in an official way. Therefore, I would suggest that you should think about the coming election. That is some opportunity, which does not imply unnatural change in South Vietphái mạnh. It is an opportunity for you lớn prove your desire to settle the problems of Vietnam, both military questions & political questions.

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Third, you have spoken about the question of prisoners. In my questions, I have sầu khổng lồ some extent made clear my point of view. You said that we should not waste our time in discussing this question here.

Kissinger: I meant the two-month difference. I said we should not waste time on that point.

Xuan Thuy: So I’ll refrain from discussing this question now.

But I should point out that you have launched many campaigns with respect to the question of POW’s. You are stepping up such campaigns now. In our view, we think such campaigns may deceive sầu a number of Americans in that they are aimed at deceiving a number of Americans to cover up your real intentions. But as far as the Vietnamese are concerned, the people who are fighting for their independence, these campaigns have sầu no effect at all.

It is our real desire to lớn settle the problem. If a settlement is to lớn be reached, we should go straight lớn the gist of the problem, and should not use such problems as these for propagandomain authority.

Fourth, you have sầu mentioned Laos và Cambodia. You have mentioned withdrawal from Indochimãng cầu. We have sầu repeatedly made clear our view on that. We have sầu been stating many times that we respect the sovereignty, neutrality, và territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Kingdom of Laos. We have sầu been respecting the Geneva Agreements of 1954 & 1962.

For the time being, there are contacts & meetings between the representatives of Prince Souphanouvong và Prince Souvanmãng cầu. It is our earnest desire khổng lồ see the Laotians come lớn a peaceful settlement of their own problems.

Fifth, you said you would not be here if President Nixon had not wanted a rapid settlement of the conflict. It is our assessment, too. We know that Mr. Special Adviser is an important personality in the U.S. Administration. You have sầu to lớn cross the ocean many times to come here. It is evident that the purpose is important. Your position is important. Your work is important.

It is the same for our own government. It is also the earnest desire of our own government to lớn see the problem of Vietnam giới settled on the basis of respect for the independence & sovereignty of Vietphái mạnh.

That is why I myself, as a Minister, and Mr. Le Duc Tho, one of the leaders of our own buổi tiệc nhỏ, have sầu been sent here. We have come here as people who have the confidence & trust of our government và tiệc ngọt và with competence và authority to lớn settle the problem. If it had not been so, then our government would have sent here some other Ambassador, and I would not be here. I have been here for over two years. Since May, 1968.

But the question is how to lớn settle the problem. You said that we should consider whether further military operations should continue, since the U.S. will continue also. And we should consider whether the long-term future of the DRV would be jeopardized.

I have sầu many times told you that the objective sầu for our nation and the Vietnamese people is genuine peace và genuine independence. It is natural that we should follow the path of negotiations lớn reach genuine peace and independence. But on the contrary if you purposely or deliberately apply your policy of aggression against our country there is no other way left for us but to lớn continue our struggle. This has been proven by bibleknights.com. We are not making aggression against anyone. We are not doing any harm whatsoever khổng lồ the U.S. In comparison khổng lồ the U.S. we are a far smaller country. Our might và power are not as great as that of the U.S. There is no reason why we would seek problems with the U.S.

What we want is that neither the U.S. nor any other country make aggression against our country và should leave us alone. The Vietnamese people would be able lớn engage in the peaceful construction of Vietphái mạnh. They would establish peaceful relations with all countries, including the U.S.

It is our hope the day will come when you will invite me và Le Duc Tho khổng lồ visit the U.S. I hope also the day will come when we could invite you khổng lồ Hanoi.

We are not afraid of a policy of violence, but we would very much prefer negotiations.

Now I will not relate all the developments since we met last time in September. I will only relate here the developments since October.

Kissinger: You’re telling me that you are just skipping one month.

Xuan Thuy: You kept extending the war to Cambodia. You launched a total victory chiến dịch against Cambodia. It has failed. No settlement has been reached in Cambodia.

Kissinger: May I interrupt the Minister. We will get nowhere if we keep repeating bibleknights.com. I didn’t repeat bibleknights.com.

Xuan Thuy: No, I would lượt thích to lớn speak on which way is better, the policy of violence or the policy of negotiations.

You launched Lam Son 719 into lớn Laos. As a result the U.S. & puppet troops failed. You intended to lớn cut Laos into lớn two parts. Your tactics, your strategy have failed too. You are making a great giảm giá khuyến mãi of propagandomain authority about the successful policy of Vietnamization, that as a result of the success of Vietnamization the Saigon Administration can stand alone. But I should say that before the application of the Vietnamization policy this Saigon Administration was there. It was there not because of the success of Vietnamization but because of the presence of U.S. forces.

Now for troop withdrawal. You would withdraw by the air or by the sea. You could withdraw by the airways you control; you have sầu enough. The seaways are under your control because of your great number of ships. You should have withdrawn all forces rapidly, but you are unwilling khổng lồ do that. Does that mean that conditions are not ripe for withdrawals, or that you vì not have sầu the means for withdrawals? Now many American persons, politicians, military people, affirm that it would take only fifteen days khổng lồ withdraw U.S. forces.

Kissinger: That’s total nonsense. Besides we have an agreement in these meetings that the Minister will not phản hồi on the U.S. domestic situation.

Xuan Thuy: Because you thought we have to follow your intentions & because your own people, Americans, make assessments of the situation in Vietnam giới, therefore I have lớn quote them. If they make bibleknights.comments on the Middle East—

Kissinger: The Minister và I have sầu an understanding. We’ll take care of our public opinion và you of yours.

Xuan Thuy: We have made such an understanding, but since your public opinion speaks on the situation, therefore we must give sầu an interpretation.

Kissinger: All right, but I won’t listen khổng lồ it at these meetings.

Xuan Thuy: So now I say that it is our earnest desire lớn have sầu serious negotiations. I suppose you too have an earnest desire for serious negotiations. Therefore I have sầu analyzed which is the better way, the policy of violence or of negotiations. We are reluctant lớn follow the policy of violence. If you follow the policy of violence, I don’t think you will obtain the results you think. Therefore it is better lớn have sầu serious negotiations.

Such are our preliminary remarks after hearing your opening bibleknights.comment và seven points & concluding paragraphs. But it is natural that to comprehensively understand these proposals they will need further study.

Kissinger: Naturally.

Xuan Thuy: So the only suggestion I have sầu is that: of these seven points, are there any points that we should pay particular attention to? If so, let me know.

Secondly, is there any point we have sầu not clearly understood và on which you want to lớn give a fuller explanation?

Kissinger: Let me ask some questions. The Minister pointed out that if a date was set this could pave sầu the way for solution of other problems rapidly and easily. Is that correct?

Xuan Thuy: Right.

Kissinger: Am I to lớn understand that the DRV is prepared to lớn release prisoners if we set a date?

Xuan Thuy: First I should say that I have sầu pointed out three points at the 109th session at Kleber Street và subsequent sessions. I găng, lay emphasis on the first point.

Secondly, the date you would phối should be a reasonable one for rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces. It should not be a date just for a date’s sake, or very far away.

Kissinger: I underst&.

Xuan Thuy: And if such a date is phối then it would open the way for a settlement of all other questions including the question of captured military personnel.

Kissinger: I have sầu heard this. But what I want to know is what does “open the way” mean? Will the prisoners be released if we mix a date?

Xuan Thuy: I said already that if a date is set then all other questions will be settled, including captured personnel.

Kissinger: Can I put down “yes” in my notes?

Xuan Thuy: All other questions, including the question of captured military men, will be settled. You have sầu not mix a date, you have sầu not given a specific date, & you can not expect a specific answer.

Kissinger: I don’t want a specific answer. You can make the answer conditional. If a date is fixed, mutually agreed, will the prisoners be released? Or will the Minister begin khổng lồ speak of prisoners? We have sầu too much experience on that.

Xuan Thuy: We have sầu a precedent with the French in the past. After the signing of the Geneva Agreement all French prisoners of war were released immediately.

So on this question now we have sầu shown more flexibility. We have said that once the date is set after that discussions will begin on the question of release. When we say discussions on release that means coming lớn release. You have apprehensions about discussions but there will be no discussion without setting a date. And there can be no settlement without discussion.

Kissinger: I had an experience with Mr. Sung’s predecessor, Mai Van Bo, in 1967. We were told that if we stopped the bombing there would be constructive sầu negotiations. Four years later we have stopped the bombing và this hasn’t led to constructive negotiations.

I tell you categorically that we will not mix a date without assurance that this will lead to lớn the release of prisoners of war. We would not phối a date. This is not subject to lớn negotiations. We will not mix a date in exchange for discussions.

Let me now be concrete about our proposal. We must be realistic. The Minister is skillful enough khổng lồ keep this discussion going for the next six years if he wants to. You have sầu told me that if we phối a date it would lead rapidly & easily khổng lồ solution of all other problems. This is the purpose of our final offer. If you tell us that the basic offer is acceptable, i.e., that all other points I have mentioned, including the release of prisoners, are agreed, I will then give you a date. You will of course have sầu your own idea about that date. Once we agree the other measures will be worked out in complete detail. And we believe sầu that with good will on both sides this can be done rapidly.

Now let me say a realistic word about political questions. I am of course familiar with the three points that the Minister made at the 109th session. But we are talking now about reality. I told the Minister at our first meeting nearly two years ago that the longer the war goes on the more difficult it is for the U.S. to lớn influence the situation in Saigon. If the war goes on another two years it will be more difficult still. This is why we say that this is our last opportunity for you và us lớn have sầu a serious negotiation.

The Minister has pointed out that there will be elections in South Vietphái nam this year. Of course I will not presume to lớn lecture the Minister about the political situation in Vietnam. I want to lớn make two assertions lớn the Minister. First, the U.S. will not interfere in the political process of the elections. Secondly, if you and we could settle military issues during the summer then the people of South Vietphái nam could make their decisions with full knowledge of what the military situation will be over the years ahead. They will then know the degree of American military presence which they will have sầu in the future & can therefore make their decisions accordingly. This is another reason why we should settle the issues rapidly.

We will listen if you have another political proposal, a political proposal other than the one you have sầu made. But we believe the realistic situation is best described as I have done, and therefore our final offer has an indirect impact on the political situation as well. That is for you to decide.

I want to lớn remind the Minister one more time of what I have said on several previous occasions. We have no interest in tricking you. First, we have sầu too much respect for your intelligence lớn think we are able to vày so. Secondly, we want an agreement that will last and not one that will break down in a year or two.

I suspect we have gone as far today as we can go. I would lượt thích khổng lồ ask the Minister how he proposes we continue now.

Xuan Thuy: May I have some comments on what you just said? What you just said seems to lớn me lớn say that if the war is prolonged it is due to us. It appears that the prolongation of the Paris talks is due lớn us too.

Kissinger: It is fruitless lớn discuss this.

Xuan Thuy: You see we demanded a complete và unconditional cessation of bombing to lớn begin the four-tiệc ngọt talks. You have sầu violated such an engagement. As for us we have continued the four-các buổi tiệc nhỏ talks. And the three parties were ready in Paris in November; only the Saigon Administration was absent.

Kissinger: You are serious & we are serious. I don’t doubt we have sầu different perceptions; if not, we wouldn’t be at the impasse we are at now. We must bởi something about the future or remain prisoners of the past.

Xuan Thuy: It is not my intent to lớn đánh giá the past, but since you mentioned it, I have to refer lớn it.

Through your bibleknights.comment, I see you want khổng lồ separate the military questions from the political questions. You want only khổng lồ raise the questions of prisoners và military questions. But whatever bibleknights.comment you make you say you should comply with the realistic situation. But there is one reality you don’t want to lớn comply with, that is, that you want to lớn interfere in the existing Saigon Administration. We and you should vày all we can to do our best to lớn come lớn the over of the war in all fields. Now we have agreed we should further examine your proposals.

Kissinger: Naturally.

Xuan Thuy: We have sầu to meet again.

Kissinger: Should we phối a date now, or get in touch? How much time vị you think you need to prepare a response?

Xuan Thuy: It will take a few weeks. I have sầu to look into lớn my program too. Should it be on a Sunday?

Kissinger: Sunday is easiest for me because I can be away from Washington without too many people knowing. In two or three weeks? That would be the 13th or 20th of June.

Xuan Thuy: (After discussing with his colleagues.) We are engaged the coming three weeks. How about June 27th?

Kissinger: That would be very hard for me. After the 20th it is very hard for me until mid-July. June 20th is impossible for you?

Xuan Thuy: I will be engaged.

Kissinger: Or June 21 if necessary.

Xuan Thuy: I have khổng lồ mix my program. I propose we get in liên hệ later.

Kissinger: Is the 27th possible for you? It is impossible for me.

Xuan Thuy: In early July?

Kissinger: I won’t know.

Xuan Thuy: We shall get in tương tác later.

Kissinger: Let me explain the technical side to you. It is very hard for me to lớn come secretly. The next time I propose khổng lồ go on an official trip to London và come over here from London. To vì that I must know about two khổng lồ three weeks ahead of time khổng lồ make plausible my trip. A sudden trip lớn London will raise suspicions và discussions.

There is one other technical difficulty—there is no reason to lớn bother you with these, but just so you know my problem. I have sầu a tentative sầu plan khổng lồ be the official representative khổng lồ the inauguration of the President of Korea for July 1. If I vì chưng that I am in that area for 10 days. If so, I couldn’t be here until mid-July. I say this only to indicate that I am not playing games with you. You should get in touch with General Walters.

Xuan Thuy: Before you go lớn Korea, can you come here?

Kissinger: I can come June 20th. I know this is difficult for you. I could come on the 21st or if necessary on the 19th.

Xuan Thuy: These few days are very difficult. But you should be in Korea on what date?

Kissinger: July 1.

Xuan Thuy: Can you come before then?

Kissinger: Tell me what dates are possible for you.

Xuan Thuy: The 27th or 28th.

Kissinger: If I go, I know I must leave sầu on the 26th. Therefore it must be before the 26th.

Xuan Thuy: The 26th?

Kissinger: The 25th at the lathử nghiệm.

Xuan Thuy: So you can come on the 25th?

Kissinger: What is the earliest date that you can—I hate to do this—I would like to be cooperative.

Xuan Thuy: For me the best is the 27th. Since we are discussing the 25th, I should Đánh Giá my program.

Kissinger: The 24th is a meeting date (plenary). Is the 23rd impossible?

Xuan Thuy: I shall see.

Kissinger: Let us say either the 23rd or the 25th.

Xuan Thuy: Either the 23rd or the 25th.

Kissinger: The 23rd is much better for me. That I can make definitely.

Xuan Thuy: And the 25th?

Kissinger: I will try very hard.

Xuan Thuy: I will choose which of the two days & inkhung General Walters.

Kissinger: May I suggest one other thing in the interval. I am certain this will be considered very seriously by your government. Let me propose that both sides avoid inflammatory actions during the interval. I am not asking for assurances. I am just suggesting in order to create a useful atmosphere.

Secondly, of course, if you reject this proposal, there will be no concrete problems. But if in general this is agreeable, if in general this has possibilities, then I would recommkết thúc that both sides be prepared to lớn talk concretely on all points and any other points they want to discuss, & also to establish a concrete work program.

I only want khổng lồ repeat one thing. In our judgment the best possible way to have political impact is to have sầu a military solution this year.

If I can say one other personal thing, one other point. The last time between our first và second meeting your colleague Madame Binh made a public bibleknights.comment. While this has good propagandomain authority purpose, it makes it difficult for serious negotiations because it forces us to lớn make a public reply.

I have sầu trouble enough with my colleagues khổng lồ try and tell you how lớn khuyễn mãi giảm giá with yours.

Xuan Thuy: In connection with your first point.

Kissinger: What’s my first point?

Xuan Thuy: With regard to lớn taking inflammatory actions. I would like to express my hope & desire khổng lồ observe sầu this. It depends mostly on the NLF–PRG. I will convey this to lớn them.

Kissinger: I understand. It is a suggestion, not a proposition.

Xuan Thuy: As to lớn your second point. In case your proposal is accepted in general, then next time we should be prepared khổng lồ discuss all concrete questions. Naturally, we must study first.

Kissinger: Do you think we need more than one day?

Xuan Thuy: Let me study first.

Kissinger: You can tell General Walters concerning the meeting time. It is very difficult lớn arrange.

Xuan Thuy: As to lớn Madame Binh’s bibleknights.comment, she has her right to make a bibleknights.comment. She is very prepared to meet Mr. Special Adviser, but you refuse khổng lồ meet her.

Kissinger: I will ruin her reputation.

(Mr. Vy talked to lớn Xuan Thuy.)

Xuan Thuy: I would propose also that you should examine our preliminary remarks.

Kissinger: We will do so very carefully, you can be very certain. Very sure.

Is there any possibility that my colleague, Special Adviser Le Duc Tho, will attkết thúc these meetings in the future?

Xuan Thuy: I don’t know yet. As for myself, if I return to Hanoi, people would like khổng lồ retain me there.

Kissinger: That’s why you must stay here.

Xuan Thuy: So, lượt thích you, it is difficult lớn make trips. It is the same for me also.